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Abstract: We examine the relationship between real and financial integration. Real integration is 
measured by productivities of capital and labor from trade data for 1982 to 1997. Financial integration is 
measured by the black market exchange rate. We find more evidence of convergence to equality for 
returns to capital than for returns to labor. There is some support for associating the convergence of black 
market premia with declines in black market premia. 
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 In this paper, we use the relative factor content of international trade to estimate
the productivities of capital and labor and examine how changes in them from 1982 to
1997 are related to ﬁnancial integration. There is little information available on factor
r e t u r n st h a ti sc o m p a r a b l ea c r o s sc o u n t r i e sb u ta v a i l a b l ed a t ao nf a c t o rr e t u r n sa r e
correlated with these productivities of labor and capital computed from trade data.1
We start with a standard international-trade model: the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek
(HOV) model. In this standard model of an integrated world in which all countries
produce all goods, trade in factor services is a function of a country’s endowments
relative to its consumption of factor services, and trade in goods is a substitute for
direct trade in factor services and for migration of factors. With identical technologies,
the HOV model implies that 1. A country has a comparative advantage in producing
goods that use its relatively more abundant factors, 2. A country is a net exporter
of its relatively abundant factors’ services and 3. Factor returns are equalized across
countries.2
Empirical tests of the HOV model examine the relationship between endowments
and the observed pattern of trade and ﬁnd that the HOV model explains little of
the direction or magnitude of trade.3 In addition, violations of absolute factor price
equalization are virtually self-evident in the data on measured wages across countries.
Hence, there must be explanations of the factor content of trade besides the simple
HOV model.
Half a century ago, Leontief (1953) suggested a possible explanation for the HOV
model’s poor performance — some countries may use factors of production more eﬃ-
1Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2007) provide references.
2At the level of aggregation used for the countries in this paper, there are no industries with zero
production. This suggests to us that the conditions for factor price equalization are likely not to be
wildly unrealistic in the context of the diﬀerences across countries envisaged in the theory.
3A partial list of these studies include Maskus (1985) Bowen, Leamer, and Sveikauskus (1985),
Treﬂer (1993, 1995) and Davis and Weinstein (2001).
1ciently than others. An innovative series of papers by Bowen, Leamer and Sveikauskas
(1987) and Treﬂer (1993, 1995) followed Leontief’s suggestion and introduced techno-
logical diﬀerences into the HOV model. Treﬂer (1993) shows that factor-augmenting
technology can equate actual trade in factor services and the theoretically implied
trade in factor services. Allowing for factor-augmenting technological diﬀerences im-
plies that factor prices are equalized in terms of relative eﬃciency units. For example,
if labor-augmenting technology is ﬁve times higher in the United States than in Mex-
ico, workers in the U.S. will receive a wage that is ﬁve times greater than the wage paid
to workers who are in Mexico and otherwise identical. Treﬂer presents evidence that
there is a strong relationship between relative factor payments and relative factor-
augmenting productivity.
In an earlier paper, Robert Tamura and we (Baier, Dwyer and Tamura 2007) also
show that these measures of factor-augmenting technology obtained from trade the-
ory are related to total factor productivity. Theoretically, factor productivity implied
by trade is similar to total factor productivity in the following sense: If factor pro-
ductivity indicates that a unit of capital in the United States is twice as productive
as a unit of capital in the Philippines, then the return to capital will be twice as high
in the U.S. as in the Philippines. Similarly, for a given level of capital in the U.S. and
the Philippines, if total factor productivity in the U.S. is twice as high as total factor
productivity in the Philippines, then capital and labor’s returns can be twice as high
in the U.S. Therefore, total factor productivity has the same eﬀect on the returns to
capital and labor as factor productivity from the HOV model.
In that earlier paper, we examined the determinants of factor productivity across
countries. We found that protection of private property rights is the single most
important explanation of cross-country diﬀerences in factor productivity in 1997.
Democracy has little relationship with trade productivities once property rights are
included in the analysis. Measures of geography other than distance to a large market
2are not important.
In this paper, we examine changes in the productivity of capital and labor over
time and how they are related to a particular measure of ﬁnancial integration.
We ﬁnd that capital productivities around the world are more similar than labor
productivities in 1982 and also show much more evidence of converging from 1982
to 1997. Measuring ﬁnancial integration for a set of countries that includes many
diﬀerent levels of development of ﬁnancial markets is diﬃcult. We suggest black
market exchange rates as a measure of ﬁnancial integration. Overall, black market
exchange rates deviate less from oﬃcial exchange rates by 1995 than they did in 1980.
We ﬁnd some evidence that this convergence of black market exchange rates to oﬃcial
rates has been associated with convergence of capital productivities.
In the next section, we summarize how the productivities of labor and capital are
computed. We then summarize the data on black market exchange rates and examine
the data for an association of changes in black market exchange rates and capital and
labor productivities.
PRODUCTIVITIES OF LABOR AND CAPITAL
The productivities of labor and capital are those implied by international trade in
goods given assumptions about technology and consumption of goods across countries.
HOV Theory and Productivity Diﬀerences
The details of the computation of labor and capital productivities are available
elsewhere (Treﬂer 1993; Baier, Dwyer and Tamura 2007.) In this section, we outline
how the productivities are computed.
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theory of trade can be used to generate measures of
productivity based on a comparison of the measured factor content of trade and a
3predicted factor content of trade. The basic analytical construct is a transformation
of trade in goods into implicit trade of the factor services used to produce the goods.
The computations assume that countries have identical constant returns to scale
production functions, markets are perfectly competitive, and the world is free from
barriers that distort trade. This means that the measures of productivity reﬂect
tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers or inducements to trade. To rule out corner solutions
in which there is no trade in some goods, the analysis assumes that endowments of
factors across countries are distributed in such a way that there is an integrated world
equilibrium with all countries producing some of all goods. The analysis proceeds by
comparing the measured factor content of trade and a predicted factor content given
the endowment of factor services in a country.
The measured factor content of trade is determined from actual trade in goods
at a detailed level. A presumed common technology of an input-output matrix of
coeﬃcients for the United States is used to determine this measured factor content
of trade.
The predicted factor content of trade is a function of factor availability, production
and domestic consumption. In the baseline HOV model, there are no diﬀerences in
how eﬃciently factors are used across countries and resources are fully employed. If
people in all countries have identical and homothetic preferences, country i’s expendi-
ture is proportional to its share of world expenditure. The predicted factor content of
trade is factor use in domestic production minus factor use in domestic consumption.
The measured factor content of trade need not equal the predicted factor content
of trade. These diﬀerences are the basis of the numerous tests of whether the HOV
model characterizes actual trade.
An alternative way of posing the issue is to ask what diﬀerences in technology or
productivity are necessary for the measured and predicted factor content of trade to
be the same, an innovation due to Treﬂer (1993.) The measured factor content of
4trade is the same as the measured content of trade based on the common technology
above. Suppose that technology diﬀerences are factor augmenting and the same across
industries in a country. Then the predicted factor content of trade by a country
adjusted for diﬀerences in productivity involves the unknown productivities for each
factor for each country. Equating the measured and predicted factor contents of trade
provides a productivity matrix for all countries for all factors.
A normalization is necessary because the productivities can be determined inde-
pendently for all but one country.4 It is standard to normalize the productivities to
one for the United States, which is natural given that the “common technology” is
measured from United States input-output tables. Measuring the productivities by
the average for all the countries is one obvious alternative normalization. For our
purposes of measuring productivities over time, it is more informative to measure the
productivities relative to the average for all countries rather than relative to the U.S.
If measured relative to the U.S., then productivity change in a country is measured
relative to productivity change in the U.S. If measured relative to the average, then
productivity change in a country is measured relative to productivity change in the
average country.
Data
As is standard in most empirical trade research, the data used in this study are
drawn from a variety of sources. All data are for 79 countries in each year based
on up to 32 industries of traded goods. The data on trade ﬂows are from Feenstra
(2000.)
For inputs, we use data for the capital stock and the labor force measured in ef-
fective labor units. The capital stock measures are constructed using the perpetual
4While not obvious from this development, the estimates of productivity for a factor are inde-
pendent of mismeasurement of the quantities of other factors and their productivities.
5i n v e n t o r ym e t h o dw i t ha na n n u a ld e p r e c i a t i o nr a t eo f13.3 percent, as in Leamer
(1984), using real investment data from Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006). Aggre-
gate labor force is converted into eﬀective labor force units by multiplying the labor
force by exp(ϕ(educi,exper i)) where educi is the number of years of schooling for the
average worker in country i, experi is the average level of experience in country i and
exp(ϕ(educi,exper i)) reﬂects returns to education and experience.5 Data on the labor
force are from the World Bank (2002) and data for the conversion to eﬀective labor
are from Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006).
Our construction of the direct and indirect input requirement of factors to produce
goods is standard (Bowen, Leamer and Sveikauskas 1987). Input requirements are
based on the 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997 input-output tables for the United States. The
stocks of capital by industry in the U.S. are from the U.S. series “ﬁxed reproducible
tangible wealth.” To equate the total of these capital stocks and our computed U.S.
perpetual-inventory aggregate capital stock, the capital stock in each industry is
multiplied by the ratio of the U.S. perpetual-inventory aggregate capital stock to the
total of the U.S. capital stocks from ﬁxed reproducible tangible wealth. This results
in a sum of the capital stocks by industry in the U.S. equal to our estimate of the
aggregate U.S. capital stock. Data for the U.S. labor force employed in each sector
are from the National Income and Product Accounts of the United States and the
Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray (2002) productivity database for 1982, 1987, 1992 and
1997. The total labor force is adjusted to equal the World Bank’s estimate of the U.S.
labor force (World Bank 2002). Data on workers’ average education by industry for
5The derivatives of ϕ(educi,experi) are the returns to an additional year of schooling or experience
that can be estimated from Mincerian wage regressions. As in Hall and Jones (1999), Debaere and
Demiroglu (2003) and Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006), we assume that the return to education
for the ﬁrst four years of schooling is 13.4 percent, 10.1 percent for the second four years and 6.8
percent for all years of education above the 8th year. As in Bils and Klenow (2000), we assume the
return to experience is quadratic.
6the U.S. are from the 1990 Census (Ruggles, Sobek et al. 2003). Income per capita
and population are from the World Bank (2002).
Each country’s share of world consumption is its share of absorption of goods and
services in all countries.
CAPITAL AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITIES
Estimated Productivities
T a b l e1s h o w st h el i s to fc o u n t r i e sf o rw h i ch we have computed productivities. The
countries are from quite diﬀerent parts of the world, with quite diﬀerent levels of
incomes and associated development.
Figure 1 shows the labor and capital productivities for each of the countries for
1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997. All of these productivities are normalized so that the
average productivity of labor and the average productivity of capital are unity in
each year.
It is apparent from Figure 1 that there is a substantial amount of variation that at
ﬁrst glance has little to do with the productivity of labor and capital as commonly
understood. For example, Madagascar — MDG in the graphs — has the highest capital
productivity in the world in 1982, 1987 and 1992 and one of the highest in the world in
1997. Why? With the exception of being an importer of crude oil and an exporter of
petroleum products, Madagascar primarily exports agricultural products and imports
goods for use on the islands. Switzerland (CHE in the ﬁgures) has the highest labor
productivity in the world. These ﬁgures are not obviously implausible. It is arguable
that, at least in some cases, the productivities are distorted by resources such as oil
deposits that are not included in the calculations.
Table 2 provides summary statistics on the productivities. The standard deviation
of the productivity of labor increases from 1982 to 1987 and then changes little by
71997. The range increases with the lower end of the range lower in 1997 than in
1982 and the upper end of the range virtually the same in 1982 and 1997. In some
ways, this is surprising given the emphasis on globalization. The standard deviation
of the productivity of capital, though, declines from 1982 to 1997. The range of the
productivities of capital declines due to a decrease in the maximum. Probably the
standard deviations are a better indicator of the changes in the distribution than the
ranges, which can be aﬀected by idiosyncratic variation in individual countries, but
there is little evidence of convergence of the labor productivities.
It might seem that the apparent convergence of capital productivity could be a
reﬂection of the decline in the calculated productivity of capital in Madagascar. Such
is not the case. The standard deviations of capital productivity without Madagascar
for each year are 1982, 0.809; 1987, 0.788; 1992, 0.492; and 1997, 0.523. While not
as large as the decline in Table 2, the decrease in the standard deviation still is
substantial.6
The median labor productivity has declined, which means that labor productivity in
the typical country has not increased as rapidly as it has in these countries on average.
At the same time, the median capital productivity has increased, approaching one by
1997. This is an interesting diﬀerence.
6Steven Ongena suggested treating some additional high capital productivity countries as outliers.
We deleted high initial capital productivity countries in addition to Madagascar, namely Trinidad
and Tobago, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. With these additional ob-
servations deleted, the standard deviation of capital productivities decreases uniformly from 0.667
to 0.448. The estimated coeﬃcients of autoregressions similar to those in Table 3 show less mean
reversion for capital productivity, which is to be expected. (The autoregressive coeﬃcient is 0.87).
Interestingly, the constant term in the regression for labor productivity is small relative to its mean
with these four countries deleted.
T h em o r eg e n e r a li s s u eo ft h ee ﬀects of natural resources and specialized production arrangements
on these estimated productivities is an interesting question that we are examining in our continuing
research.
8The correlations of labor and capital productivities increase consistently from the
low value of 0.04 in 1982 to the highest value of 0.39 in 1997.
Figures 2 and 3 provide a diﬀerent perspective on the distributions of capital and
labor productivities.
The distributions of labor productivity and capital productivity are quite diﬀerent.
The labor productivities are skewed, with more countries below the average than
above it. This ﬁgure provides some perspective on the reason for the diﬀerent behavior
of the medians of the distributions of labor and capital productivity. Median labor
productivity actually fell from 0.62 in 1982 to 0.48, 0.49 and 0.50 in 1987, 1992 and
1997. At the same time, median capital productivity rose from 0.72 and 0.70 in 1982
and 1987 to 0.89 and 0.97 in 1992 and 1997. The arithmetic averages, of course, are
one throughout.
Standard convergence regressions also lead to the conclusion that capital produc-
tivity has converged and labor productivity has not. Table 3 presents a variant of
standard unconditional-convergence regressions, which basically are unit-root tests.
The regressions are run for 1997 as the ﬁnal year and 1982 as the initial year. It is
most informative to present the regressions in levels with the t-ratio for the Dickey-
Fuller test and we do that in the table. The autoregressive coeﬃcients themselves
highlight the diﬀerence. The coeﬃcient for labor in 1982 is very close to one. The
coeﬃcient for capital in 1982 is well below one.7 The constant term in the labor
regression suggests that there is a very large downward trend in labor productivity,
w h i c hi sd u b i o u sa tb e s tg i v e nF i g u r e2 . 8 There deﬁnitely is a downward moment
of the relatively low labor productivities, but this cannot translate into a downward
trend because the productivities have a lower bound of zero.
7Regressions for the logarithms of the productivities lead to the same conclusion concerning
convergence of productivities.
8We thank Jouko Vilmunen for pointing this out to us.
9There are, of course, lots of reasons to be dubious about these regressions for
generating conclusions.9 Nonetheless, the results are striking in terms of the question
under consideration. A natural result of integration of economies is convergence of
returns to factors of production. Has there been integration in the sense that capital
productivities have become more similar? The answer fairly clearly is “yes”. Has
there been integration in terms of labor productivities? Not obviously!
In one sense, this result is not surprising. Financial markets have become more
integrated and this can have a fairly direct eﬀect of raising low returns to capital in
some countries by supporting an outﬂow and lowering high returns in other countries
by supporting an inﬂow.
In another sense, this result is surprising if taken at face value. If the marginal
product of capital increases because of inﬂows of capital, this increases the demand
for labor and the marginal product of labor should increase unless the elasticity of
supply of labor is inﬁnite.
Are capital and labor productivities this disconnected? A little bit of evidence
says not. The correlations of changes in labor and capital productivities are indeed
positive. The correlation of changes in labor productivity and capital productivity is
0.38 from 1982 to 1997. While hardly overwhelming, this correlation is not zero.10 The
correlation of changes in the logarithms of the productivities is quite a bit higher, 0.80,
suggesting that there is quite a bit of force to this argument, the seeming disconnect
between the changes in the distributions of the productivities aside.
Figure 4 illustrates the issue in a diﬀerent way. Figure 4 shows the growth rate
of labor and capital productivity in each country for 1982 to 1997. Many countries
had rising labor and capital productivity. More than a few countries had falling
9Not the least of these reasons are shortcomings in this context of classical statistical analysis
compared to a Bayesian approach along the lines of Dwyer et al (2007).
10The p-value for a test that the correlation is zero is 0.06 percent, far less than usual statistical
signiﬁcance levels.
10labor and capital productivity. It is worthwhile recalling that the productivities are
measured relative to the average in each year, so falling productivity does not mean
that returns to labor and capital falls. Falling productivity in Figure 4 means that
returns to labor and capital fell relative to the average. While not as bad as falling
absolutely, falling behind hardly is attractive. More than a few countries also had
falling labor productivity and rising capital productivity. Only two, Cyprus and
Singapore, had rising labor productivity and falling capital productivity.
Perhaps a measure of ﬁnancial market integration will be informative about the
integration of capital markets, and possibly labor markets as well.
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
With such a disparate set of countries, it is not immediately obvious how to measure
ﬁnancial integration.
The best measure would be the set of prices of various risk factors in foreign mar-
kets. This has a solid theoretical basis and an unambiguous interpretation. Such
measures based on markets for stocks and bonds are not likely to be very useful for
our set of countries though. A country such as Vietnam for example is unlikely to
have representative data from ﬁnancial markets to permit reliable and comparable
estimation of the prices of risk factors. The same statement can be made for many
other countries in our set of data.
An alternative measure is the openness of domestic ﬁnancial markets to foreigners.
This is the path followed by Edison and Warnock (2003). Examination of their
data reveals though, that even this measure is not available for many markets, no
doubt because some of our countries do not have organized exchanges with data
available. Instead of going down this road, we examine the foreign exchange market
as a plausible candidate for informative data.
We suggest that the black market premium is likely to be a useful measure of ﬁnan-
11cial integration. A black market is prima facie evidence of an imperfectly functioning
market for foreign exchange. In addition, a black market for foreign exchange implic-
itly indicates that some transactions occur at more favorable exchange rates, which is
itself an indication of likely favoritism in the allocation of preferential exchange rates
and corruption in at least some cases. Finally, a black market in foreign exchange
is likely to be associated with other policies that hinder the eﬃcient operation of a
country’s economy and would be reﬂected in low productivities of labor and capital.
Data on Black Market Exchange Rate
The data on the black market exchange rate are from a compilation of black mar-
ket premia by Gwartney and Lawson (2005). These data primarily are from various
issues of the MRI Bankers’ Guide to Foreign Currency. In this source, the black
market exchange rates are estimates for the parallel domestic market for foreign ex-
change (Monetary Research Institute, 2005). Gwartney and Lawson (2005, p. 177)
supplement these data by data from other sources when necessary.
Preliminary Analysis of the Data
Figure 5 shows the black market premia for 1980 and 1995. These dates are two
years before the ﬁrst and two years before the last measures of capital and labor
productivities. To facilitate later analysis, the ﬁgures show gross premia in percent,
which means that the “premium” is the black market exchange rate relative to the
oﬃcial exchange rate in percent. As a result, a gross premium of 100 percent means
t h a tt h e“ b l a c km a r k e te x c h a n g er a t e ”i st h es a m ea st h eo ﬃcial exchange rate.
It is immediately obvious in Figure 4 that the frequency of black market exchange
rates well above the oﬃcial rate has decreased markedly over the ﬁfteen years covered
by the ﬁgure. Many countries had substantial black market premia in 1980 and not
12many had much in the way of black market premia by 1995. This strikes us as prima
facie evidence of greater eﬀective ﬁnancial integration among economies.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the black market premia in 1980, 1985, 1990 and
1995. It is clear that there is substantial movement toward black market gross premia
close to 100 percent.
In one sense, the histograms are less revealing than they could be. Even in 1995,
there are quite a few countries that have gross premia above 100, in fact 41 countries.
Table 4 presents summary statistics on the black market premia for 1980, 1985, 1990
and 1995.
FINANCIAL AND REAL INTEGRATION
Figure 7 shows the relationship between changes in the black market premium
from 1980 to 1995 and capital productivity from 1982 and 1997. The ﬁgure shows
relative capital productivities and the relative black market premium. An increase
in capital productivity is an increase in capital productivity relative to the average
for the world. The gross black market premia are never less than 100 percent, so a
decrease in the relative black market premium is a decrease toward one hundred in
all cases and an improvement in integration. The horizontal and vertical reference
lines divide the ﬁgure into four quadrants. The upper left quadrant represents an
improvement in capital productivity and the black market premium, the upper right
quadrant represents an improvement in capital productivity and a worsening of the
black market premium, the lower left quadrant represents a worsening of capital
productivity and an improvement in the black market premium and the lower right
quadrant represents a worsening of capital productivity and a worsening of the black
market premium.
Few countries have higher black market premia in 1995 than in 1980. In fact only
Haiti, Venezuela and Nigeria have black market premia that increased substantially
13over those years. Each of these countries has a lower relative capital productivity in
1995 than in 1980.
It is clear that a fall in the black market premium is not a guarantee of an improve-
ment in relative capital productivity. Countries with improvements in their black
market premia have increases and decreases in relative capital productivity. Rela-
tively few countries have higher black market premia in 1995 than in 1982, but all of
t h ec o u n t r i e sw i t hl a r g ei n c r e a s e si nb l a c km a r k e tp r e m i ah a v el o w e rr e l a t i v ec a p i t a l
productivity in 1997 than in 1982. No country with a higher black market premium
in 1995 has a higher relative capital productivity in 1997.
Figure 8 shows a similar graph for labor productivity. Venezuela and Nigeria also
have lower labor productivity, although Haiti has higher labor productivity.
Does this pattern hold for subperiods?
Figure 9 shows the changes in capital productivities and black market premia for
the three subperiods. There are a few exceptions, but it still is true that increases
in capital productivity are seldom associated with increases in the black market pre-
mium.
Figure 10 shows a similar result for labor productivity.
Table 5 presents the results of Chi-square tests of association between changes in
black market premia and changes in labor and capital productivities. The changes in
black market premia are divided into three classes: falling, unchanging and increasing.
No change is quite likely since some countries never have any deviation from oﬃcial
exchange rates.11 The changes in productivities are divided into two classes: rising
and falling. Because it is a test of association, these test results do not impose any
constraints such as linearity. We interpret the p-values in Table 4 as providing some
support for the importance of black market premia for productivity.
11The fraction of countries with no change in the black market premium is 20 percent from 1980
to 1985, 25 percent from 1985 to 1990 and 38 percent from 1990 to 1995.
14CONCLUSION
Some results seem clear, even though more deﬁnitive conclusions await further
research.
Capital productivities around the world have tended to converge more than labor
productivities from 1982 to 1997. This is so even though capital productivities were
more similar than labor productivities in 1982.
Financial integration is a possible explanation for the convergence of capital pro-
ductivities. Measuring ﬁnancial integration for a set of countries that includes many
diﬀerent levels of development of ﬁnancial markets is diﬃcult. We suggest black mar-
ket exchange rates as a measure of ﬁnancial integration. Black market exchange rates
deviate less from oﬃcial exchange rates by 1995 than they did in 1980. We ﬁnd some
evidence that this convergence of black market exchange rates has been associated
with convergence of capital productivities.
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Congo Democratic Republic of Norway


































1982 Labor Productivity 1.0 0.619 0.069 3.751 0.902
1987 Labor Productivity 1.0 0.484 0.040 4.908 1.082
1992 Labor Productivity 1.0 0.495 0.042 4.327  1.090
1997 Labor Productivity 1.0 0.499 0.029 3.755 1.049
1982 Capital Productivity 1.0 0.717 0.235 8.132 1.143
1987 Capital Productivity 1.0 0.696 0.102 6.296 0.988
1992 Capital Productivity 1.0 0.891 0.126 5.809  0.734






There are 79 countries for each of the years. By construction, the mean labor productivity and mean capital productivity for each year
are one.Table 3
Convergence of Productivities to Means
1982 to 1997







1997 Labor Productivity -8.011 1.011 0.017 .753 .521
(.088) (.065)
1997 Capital Productivity 0.731 0.269 -16.538 .324 .447
(.067) (.044)
The t-ratios of parameters are in parentheses.Table 4
Summary Statistics on Black Market Exchange Rates
1980 to 1995
All Black Market Exchange Rates
Year Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard
Deviation
1980 145.9 106 728 100 99.5
1985 165.8 107 1346 100 175.9
1990 124.3 104 516 100   61.5
1995 109.1 101 386 100 39.4
1997 109.5 101 371  100 34.5
                      Black Market Exchange Rates Not Equal to Official Exchange Rate
Year Number of
Observations
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard
Deviation
1980 61 159.4 116 728 101 109.8
1985 61 185.2 119 1346   101 196.3
1990 47 140.9 113 516  101 75.6
1995 41 117.5 103 386  101  53.6
1997 48 115.6   104   371  101 43.3Table 5
Tests for Association Between Productivities and Black Market Exchange Rates
1982 to 1997
Changes Chi-square Chi-square p-value
Productivity Black Market
Exchange Rate
1982 to 1987 Labor Productivity 1980 to 1985 3.779 .151
1987 to 1992 Labor Productivity 1985 to 1990 8.313 .016
1992 to 1997 Labor Productivity 1990 to 1995 3.847 .146
1982 to 1987 Capital Productivity 1980 to 1985 3.785 .151
1987 to 1992 Capital Productivity 1985 to 1990 9.944 .007









































































































BRA CHL COL ECU
GUY
PRY
















































































































































































































































Capital Productivities in 1982 and 1997-2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0














































































































































Growth Rates of Labor and Capital Productivities
                        1982 to 1997100 300 500 700
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Gross Black Market Premium
1995 and 1980
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Distribution of Black Market Premia
     1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995
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Relative Black Market Rates, 1980 to 1995, and Relative Capital Productivites, 1982 to 19970.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0





























































































































Relative Black Market Rates, 1980 to 1995, and Relative Labor Productivites, 1982 to 19970123


















































































































Relative Black Market Rates and Relative Capital Productivities
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Black Market Premium 1995 Relative to 1990
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